
3.227 Fall and Rise of China: The Fall of Moulmein
Notas del episodio
Last time we spoke about the race to Rangoon. Japan pressed into Burma with brutal efficiency, marching men, elephants, and oxen over impossible jungle ranges to seize Tavoy, Mergui, and Victoria Point at minimal cost, while Aung San's Burma Independence Army trailed behind, courting recruits and stoking anti-British sentiment. Japanese bombers pounded Rangoon, aiming not at docks but at civilian morale, triggering mass flight—though defenders, aided by radar and the Observer Corps, inflicted surprisingly heavy losses. General Hutton, newly arrived, correctly guessed Rangoon would be the main target and positioned his thin forces accordingly, sending 16 Brigade under Jones to Kawkareik under the ailing but capable Major-General Smyth. When the Japanese 55th Division attacked in January, panic, rumor, and miscommunication—not enemy strength—shattered the defense: a ferry sank, mules were mistaken for attackers, and whole units dissolved into disorderly retreat. Kawkareik fell almost bloodlessly, exposing how untrained troops, thrust into unfamiliar jungle terrain, could be undone by fear alone rather than by the Japanese themselves.
#227 The Fall of Moulmein
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.Between 23-29 January, the Japanese launched an all-out bid for air superiority over Rangoon. The week's fighting was lopsided in Britain's favor: 17 Japanese aircraft downed and ten damaged, against just two AVG and ten RAF losses. The Japanese pulled back to sporadic night raids, but the victory was pyrrhic — Britain had no fighters left. Reinforcements came just in time: three Hurricane squadrons from Egypt, though many were obsolete Mark Is with poor spares support, meaning never more than 30 were flyable at once, a number that kept dwindling. Two Lysander squadrons (RAF and Indian Air Force) and a single Blenheim squadron, capable of fielding only six planes on a good day, rounded out the meagre force.
Wavell ordered the Japanese met as far forward as possible — logical given the need to protect the Mudon and Moulmein airfields (shielding Rangoon, Burma's supply lifeline), preserve the rail link supplying China, maintain Chinese confidence in British resolve, and honor Britain's century-long relationship with the loyal Karen people of Moulmein and Tenasserim. But these sound strategic reasons created real tactical headaches for General Smyth, who knew his inexperienced troops risked being destroyed piecemeal if spread too thin. Hutton, trying to satisfy Wavell while heeding Smyth's concerns, found himself in constant friction with his subordinate.
Moulmein — Burma's third-largest town, population near 100,000, under British protection since 1826 — was hard to simply write off. Yet it sat on the far bank of the mile-and-a-half-wide Salween River, with no British boats or ferries available. Defending it with a major river at one's back was tactically dubious, but a 22 January telegram from Wavell's Java headquarters settled the matter: Moulmein would be held. The defense fell to the 2nd Burma Brigade (3, 7, and 8 Burma Rifles, plus the 4th/12th Frontier Force Rifles), supported by a mountain battery, a Bofors AA troop, about 50 Madras Sappers and Miners, and supply/medical units.
Wavell himself, overwhelmed running ABDACOM from an improvised HQ in Java, still managed one of only two personal visits to Burma during his tenure — a grueling overnight flight landing him in Rangoon on 25 January. He confirmed Hutton's plan to hold Moulmein as long as feasible, without fighting to the last man, then flew back the next night. Air raids had already battered the town, forcing Sappers to demolish buildings to halt spreading fires; most Burmese civilians fled to the countryside. District Commissioner Colonel Pelly and the brigade staff quietly evacuated British and Indian women and children by rail, and surplus stores began withdrawing too. Casualties from the raids were light, but morale suffered — punctuated by one act of doomed bravery. Major Hugh Wilberforce witnessed two Buffalo fighter pilots, facing a full enemy squadron, scramble into the air rather than take cover, "urging their planes on like jockeys riding a finish" before both were shot down within moments. The Army called it heroism; veteran RAF officers called it a needless waste of trained pilots.
On 28 January, Hutton and Smyth toured Moulmein and quietly began contingency planning for withdrawal. They also arranged — unusually — for Brigadier Ekin to take operational command from Brigadier Bourke if fighting erupted, officially because Bourke would be consumed managing the civilian evacuation, though Smyth's backhanded praise ("stout in figure and stout in heart") hinted at doubts about Bourke's battlefield acumen. Awkward as it was, the two brigadiers reportedly worked together without friction. The same meeting also greenlit a guerrilla resistance network in Karenni, homeland of the Karen people, many of whom — especially Christian Karens — remained devoted to Britain throughout the war. Major Hugh Seagrim, fluent in Karen and deeply attached to the community, volunteered to stay behind with a small stock of rifles to organize resistance. It was a promising idea undone by circumstance: the British retreat happened so fast and so completely that Seagrim was left isolated, unsupported, and unable to strike at Japanese supply lines in any way that might have altered the campaign's outcome. Had Rangoon held even briefly, his efforts might have proven decisive. Instead, the Karen homeland fell almost immediately, leaving Seagrim to carry on alone.
Having crossed the Dawna Range, 55 Division concentrated west of Kawkareik, scavenging what little the retreating British had left behind — a handful of trucks and not much else. Where equipment was lacking, ingenuity filled the gap: the division's sappers cobbled together a new ferry at Kya-in out of requisitioned sampans. On 26 January, General Iida of 15th Army gave the order that would set the campaign in motion — 55 Division was to capture Moulmein, while 33 Division concentrated east of the Salween, poised to strike toward Pa-an and cross the river there.
Two days later, 55 Division set its columns moving. 1/143 Battalion pushed down the north bank of the Gyaing River toward Kado, at its junction with the Salween, while HQ 143 Regiment — with 2/143 Battalion and 143/3 Company attached — advanced south of the Gyaing toward Moulmein itself, screening the right flank as the rest of the division crossed the Haungtharaw River at Kya-in and struck south along the road to Metheraw. Before reaching that town, 1/2 Regiment (minus 3/112 Battalion) and 55 Division's headquarters peeled off westward through Winpot, making straight for Moulmein, while the Reconnaissance Regiment continued on to Metheraw before swinging west toward Mudon — some fifteen miles south of the target — setting up a pincer from the south .
Meanwhile, on the British side, the 4th/12th Frontier Force Rifles had arrived at Moulmein around 12 January and been shuttled down the railway to its terminus at Ye, a hundred miles south — only to be recalled to Moulmein the very next day. A week later they were sent south again, this time to bolster the Tavoy garrison, but when Tavoy fell they turned back once more, a detachment of 60 Field Company blowing three railway bridges between Ye and Mudon as they went.
On 26 January, a motorised patrol under Captain "Sam" Manekshaw, probing the low, forested hills east of Mudon, ran straight into an ambush laid by the Japanese Reconnaissance Regiment. After a sharp, close-run fight, the patrol fought its way clear and fell back to a defensive position in the woods north of Mudon, where the rest of the battalion — minus one company — joined them on the 28th. The following day brought new orders: fall back to Moulmein. But 'D' Company was left at Mudon to cover the withdrawal of 'C' Company, 1st/7th Gurkhas — the same company that had been guarding the approach through the Three Pagodas Pass and had made contact only the day before. That night, disaster struck: 'D' Company was hit hard and cut off from Moulmein entirely. Both it and the Gurkhas were forced south, striking out across country to the Salween, crossing by sampan, and finally rejoining their units a week later at Kyaikto. It was a costly detour — the 4th/12th FFR now had only three companies left to help hold Moulmein, just as 55 Division closed in.
Inside the town , Brigadier Bourke had stretched his two-and-a-half battalions of Burma Rifles around an eleven-mile perimeter covering the south and east, leaning on the Salween to the north and west and the Ataran River along part of the eastern edge. A separate Burma Frontier Force police unit guarded the airfield, which sat outside the perimeter proper but within range of 12 Mountain Battery's guns. Dominating the whole position was the Ridge — a long spine running the length of the town, crowned with pagodas and the single most important piece of tactical ground on the map. Brigade headquarters sat at its southern end, alongside the 4th/12th FFR in reserve. It would not take long for events to prove what should perhaps have been obvious from the start: a perimeter this long could never survive the Japanese habit of slipping through the dark in small infiltrating groups.
The southern sector fell to 8th Burma Rifles — recruited from Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims settled in Burma, and by common consent the steadiest of the brigade's Burma Rifle battalions. The eastern sector belonged to 3 Burif (minus two companies), while 7 Burif held the river banks to the west and north. On paper, 3 Burif had just been reinforced by thirty Chin soldiers escaped from Tavoy — but the wild rumors these newcomers brought with them did the battalion's nerves more harm than their rifles did good.
For the attack, the Japanese could muster only three infantry battalions — the unit that had taken Tavoy hadn't yet arrived, and 1/143 Battalion (minus one company) was still stuck on the far side of the Gyaing. They did, however, have the Reconnaissance Regiment and five companies of mountain artillery, each fielding just two guns apiece thanks to a shortage of ammunition. Those mountain guns, though lighter — a 14-pound shell against the British 20-pounder — could reach more than twice as far. The plan called for a three-pronged assault: the Reconnaissance Regiment from the south, 1/2 Regiment (minus one battalion) from the south-east, and 2/143 Battalion from the east.
Soon after 0700 on 30 January, four British trucks packed with Japanese soldiers came rolling up the main road from the south and — whether by bold design or simple miscalculation — tried to bluff their way straight through the perimeter wire. A sharp-eyed Sikh sentry answered with a burst from his light machine gun, and every post nearby joined in. The Japanese tumbled out of their vehicles and scattered for cover, leaving more than a dozen dead behind. A full assault on the southern sector followed but was beaten back, 12 Mountain Battery lending crucial support. On the eastern side, though, the news was worse: 2/143 Battalion forced a crossing of the Ataran at Hmyawlin, and 1/2 Regiment (minus one battalion) got over further south, near the airfield
Brigadier Ekin had learned only that morning that he was taking command, and he crossed from Martaban to reach Moulmein around noon on the 30th — by which time the battle was already well underway. One look at 3 Burif told him the battalion was badly shaken, and it took no great insight to see that a perimeter this size could never be properly defended. He ordered an immediate withdrawal to a shorter line anchored on the Ridge, threw his reserve — the 4th/12th FFR — into the center of it, and shifted his headquarters from the southern end to a more central spot.
At the airfield, the small Burma Frontier Force garrison put up a stiff fight, holding the Japanese at bay for hours before finally being pushed back. Under cover of darkness they scattered, and most made it safely to Martaban, having given at least as good as they got. Through the day, 8 Burif held firm in the south, but in the north 7 Burif began to come apart, and after dark the Japanese turned their attention to the Ridge itself — only to find the 4th/12th FFR standing solidly in the way. At 2300 hours, Ekin drew the perimeter in once more, this time into a compact box covering the Ridge and the main jetties — roughly four thousand yards north to south, a thousand east to west. Firing sputtered on through the night, and while some Japanese accounts describe fierce combat, no real attack materialized, and casualties on both sides appear to have been light.
At dawn on the 31st, 143/3 Company — pulled from its parent battalion at Kado and held in reserve with HQ 143 Regiment — moved along the estuary bank to slip into Moulmein from the north. The 7 Burif company holding that stretch was caught completely off guard and bolted for the main jetties. The Japanese swept on into the unarmed gun crews of the Light Anti-Aircraft battery, overrunning all four guns — though two breech blocks were saved before they fell.
Ekin had no choice but to pull his northern line back further. Word arrived from the CO of 8 Burif that his men in the south were nearing the end of their strength, and Ekin concluded the town could not hold much longer regardless. There was a darker calculation too: if Japanese gunners managed to bring their pieces to bear on the river crossing itself, the ferries would stop running altogether. He put the situation to Smyth and received authority to withdraw whenever he judged the moment right. When word reached him that Burmese soldiers were already drifting down to the riverbank in numbers, he decided further delay would only cost lives for nothing gained. At 8am he gave the order: contract the box into a bridgehead around the main jetties.
Major Dick Ward of the Royal Engineers had fifteen ferries standing by in Martaban, and now they steamed across, five to a jetty at each of the three main landing points. The vessels' Burmese civilian crews had grown increasingly uneasy over the preceding days — every air raid warning sent them scrambling to push their boats out into mid-stream — so armed guards of sappers from 1 Burma Field Company had been placed aboard each one, partly to steady nerves and partly to make sure the boats stayed put when needed.
Each unit had its assigned jetty, and the wounded went first, along with the medical units. Officers supervised the loading, and despite some friction with Burmese stragglers trying to force their way aboard, the embarkation went smoothly — the covering troops, mostly from the 4th/12th FFR, holding the perimeter and counter-attacking wherever the enemy pressed too close.
The final hours produced their share of quiet heroism. Major John Hume of 12 Mountain Battery led a party back into danger to rescue two guns that had been cut off, saving all four pieces of his battery. Second Lieutenant Mehr Dass tried the same with the Bofors guns, dragging one all the way to the quayside — only to find there was no way to get it aboard. He went back for his men and was captured in the attempt. The very last boat out from Mission Street Jetty carried Brigade HQ, along with the sappers of 60 Field Company, fresh from demolishing the power station and telephone exchange. As the final party boarded, Japanese troops appeared on the quay itself, and the sappers were sent ashore one more time to clear them off. They succeeded — though their leader, Captain Jardine, was killed in the attempt. The steamer pulled away with the bridgehead's last defenders necessarily left behind. It was, in the end, a stroke of luck that the Japanese had only a single gun positioned to fire on the departing ferries; all but one made it across safely.
For those who didn't make the boats, survival meant one thing: staying out of Japanese hands. Fortunately, the Japanese themselves were spent after their grueling advance, and more interested in the captured food dumps than in hunting stragglers. One of the more remarkable escapes of the whole retreat was engineered by Jemadar Malligarjunan of 60 Field Company. After Captain Jardine fell, the Jemadar took charge of the party and hid them beneath Mission Street jetty — right under the nose of a Japanese mortar crew that set up on the jetty itself without ever noticing them.
Also sheltering under that same jetty, having received no order to withdraw, was Colonel Taylor, CO of 3 Burif, along with two of his officers. After dark, hearing strange noises from a nearby yard, he went to investigate — and found something he hadn't expected: "Peeping round a wall I was staggered to find the Sappers industriously building a petrol-barrel raft with their Jemadar giving instructions in loud whispers. Having completed the raft, they launched it, but the Jemadar, apparently not being satisfied, had the raft pulled ashore and taken to pieces to replace a leaking barrel. It was then re-launched, but still the Jemadar was not happy about it and had it rebuilt a second time. Then he smiled his satisfaction, came up to me, and saluting smartly said 'Raft taryar hai, Sahib' (The raft is ready, Sir). We climbed aboard but, as we dared not use paddles, the Jemadar and his men stripped and gently slid the raft into the water and guided it to safety. By keeping calm and cool in the face of the enemy, he saved me, two other officers and all his men from capture."
British records — necessarily rough estimates — put total losses at the operation at 617 men killed or missing, most of them believed to be Burmese troops who simply melted away rather than fought to the end. The 4th/12th FFR itself lost only four soldiers and three followers killed in the fighting. The Japanese, for their part, claimed 225 British killed and 148 taken prisoner — figures that look badly inflated given how light the 4th/12th FFR's own losses actually were. Colonel Oharazawa, commanding 1/2 Regiment, reported wave after wave of fierce charges and heavy fighting, but he had something of a reputation for embellishment; a nervous man who leaned heavily on drink, he would be relieved of his command not long afterward.
On the Japanese side, 2/143 Battalion recorded 14 killed, and the Reconnaissance Regiment 20 killed and 11 wounded — though no figures survive for the two battalions of 1/2 Regiment. Among the spoils, the Japanese claimed one unserviceable Blenheim bomber, seven "armoured cars," four Bofors guns, assorted vehicles, mules, equipment, and stores. Far more valuable was a discovery in the rubber plantation near the aerodrome: a hidden cache of 5,000 drums of aviation fuel — a windfall that let them put the captured airfield to us
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