Supreme Court Oral Arguments
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- 14 Oct 2026
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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court.
* Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov
* Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.
* Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available when an aligned transcript is ready).
Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument
Episodios 495
[25-459] Salazar v. Paramount Global
Oral argument for Salazar v. Paramount Global, argued on October 14, 2026.YouTube
[25-5343] Beaird v. United States
Beaird v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 13, 2026. Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner) …
Notas del episodio
Beaird v. United States
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 13, 2026.
Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
- Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner)
- Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur)
- Anthony J. Dick (Court-appointed amicus curiae)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty.
Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines.
The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary.
Question
Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
[25-579] Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan
Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2026. Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.Respondent: Prutehi Guahan. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) …
Notas del episodio
Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan
Argued on Oct 7, 2026.
Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.
Respondent: Prutehi Guahan.Advocates:
- Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners)
- Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption.
When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending.
Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings.
Question
1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law?
2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?
[25-498] Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee
Oral argument for Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, argued on October 06, 2026.YouTube
[25-735] Johnson v. United States Congress
Johnson v. United States Congress Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 5, 2026. Petitioner: Floyd D. Johnson.Respondent: United States Congress. Advocates: Jeffrey W. Chen (for the Petitioner) …
Notas del episodio
Johnson v. United States Congress
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Oct 5, 2026.
Petitioner: Floyd D. Johnson.
Respondent: United States Congress.Advocates:
- Jeffrey W. Chen (for the Petitioner)
- Kevin J. Barber (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Floyd D. Johnson, a United States Army veteran, began receiving disability benefits for service-related post-traumatic stress disorder while serving a 40-year prison sentence in Florida. Although the Veterans Benefits Administration initially approved a high level of compensation, it later reduced Johnson’s monthly payments to a 10 percent rate. The agency cited a federal law, 38 U.S.C. § 5313, which limits disability compensation for veterans incarcerated for more than 60 days following a felony conviction.
Johnson filed a lawsuit against the United States Congress in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the benefits reduction law. He argued that the statute acted as an unconstitutional “bill of attainder”—a law that unfairly targets specific individuals for punishment—and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson requested a court order to stop the government from reducing benefits for incarcerated veterans and sought retroactive pay for the withheld funds.
The district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint as frivolous after assuming it had jurisdiction to hear his constitutional claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated that judgment and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act strips district courts of the power to hear such challenges.
Question
Did the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act stripp district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this court in Johnson v. Robison, to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans’ benefits?
[25-170] Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2026. Petitioner: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.Respondent: County Commissioners of Boulder County …
Notas del episodio
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County
Argued on Oct 5, 2026.
Petitioner: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.
Respondent: County Commissioners of Boulder County.Advocates:
- Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
- Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
- Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Boulder County and the City of Boulder (collectively, "Boulder") sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy entities, alleging that the companies' decades-long production, promotion, refining, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels knowingly drove climate change and caused concrete harm to Boulder's property and residents. Boulder further alleges that the defendants compounded this harm by intentionally misleading the public about fossil fuels' role in accelerating climate change. The alleged injuries include flood damage, increased wildfire risk, drought, and physical damage to public buildings and infrastructure—costs Boulder claims it has absorbed and will continue to absorb.
To recover those costs, Boulder asserts state common law claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Critically, Boulder seeks only monetary damages—not an injunction against fossil fuel operations or any form of emissions regulation. The defendants argue that these state-law claims are precluded because federal law—specifically the Clean Air Act, the federal common law of interstate pollution, and the federal foreign affairs power—occupies the field and bars state courts from adjudicating harms rooted in interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions.
Boulder filed suit in state court; the defendants removed the case to federal court, but after extensive litigation that included appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and two certiorari petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the remand order and the case returned to the Boulder County District Court, which denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for extraordinary review under C.A.R. 21, which that court accepted and resolved in Boulder's favor on May 12, 2025.
Question
1. Does the Court have statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case?
2. Does federal law preclude state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate?
[24-889] Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc. Advocates: Charles B. Klein …
Notas del episodio
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
Argued on Apr 29, 2026.
Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc.Advocates:
- Charles B. Klein (for the Petitioners)
- Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
- Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book.
In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa.
In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement.
Question
1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales?
2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?
[25-1083] Mullin v. Doe
Mullin v. Doe Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.Respondent: Dahlia Doe. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) …
Notas del episodio
Mullin v. Doe
Argued on Apr 29, 2026.
Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Dahlia Doe.Advocates:
- D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners)
- Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1083)
- Geoffrey M. Pipoly (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1084)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis.
Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria.
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.
Question
Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?
[24-856] Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I
Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2026. Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.Respondent: Doe I. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the …
Notas del episodio
Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I
Argued on Apr 28, 2026.
Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Respondent: Doe I.Advocates:
- Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)
- Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
- Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents.
Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials.
The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context.
Question
Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?
[24-1068] Monsanto Company v. Durnell
Monsanto Company v. Durnell Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Monsanto Company.Respondent: John L. Durnell. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Sarah M. Harris (for the …
Notas del episodio
Monsanto Company v. Durnell
Argued on Apr 27, 2026.
Petitioner: Monsanto Company.
Respondent: John L. Durnell.Advocates:
- Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
- Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
- Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure.
After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment.
Question
Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?
[25-112] Chatrie v. United States
Chatrie v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin …
Notas del episodio
Chatrie v. United States
Argued on Apr 27, 2026.
Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
- Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)
- Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant.
Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court.
Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception.
Question
Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?
[25-429] Blanche v. Lau
Blanche v. Lau Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2026. Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General.Respondent: Muk Choi Lau. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the …
Notas del episodio
Blanche v. Lau
Argued on Apr 22, 2026.
Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General.
Respondent: Muk Choi Lau.Advocates:
- Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner)
- Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation.
The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition.
The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision.
Question
To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?
[25-406] Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.
Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2026. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.Respondent: AT&T, Inc. . Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for …
Notas del episodio
Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.
Argued on Apr 21, 2026.
Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.
Respondent: AT&T, Inc. .Advocates:
- Jeffrey B. Wall (for AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.)
- Vivek Suri (for the FCC, et al.)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program.
Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency.
AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.
Question
Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?
[25-197] T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: T. M.Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. Advocates: Elizabeth …
Notas del episodio
T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
Argued on Apr 20, 2026.
Petitioner: T. M.
Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation.Advocates:
- Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)
- Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply.
Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction.
Question
Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?
[25-466] Sripetch v. SEC
Sripetch v. SEC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L …
Notas del episodio
Sripetch v. SEC
Argued on Apr 20, 2026.
Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.Advocates:
- Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)
- Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell.
In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question.
Question
May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?
[25-365] Trump v. Barbara
Trump v. Barbara Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Apr 1, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.Respondent: Barbara. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) …
Notas del episodio
Trump v. Barbara
Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube
Argued on Apr 1, 2026.
Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.
Respondent: Barbara.Advocates:
- D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners)
- Cecillia D. Wang (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared that individuals born in the United States are not U.S. citizens at birth if their parents lack sufficient legal status. Specifically, the order directs federal agencies not to recognize citizenship claims for children born after February 20, 2025, if: (1) the mother was unlawfully present in the U.S. and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident (LPR), or (2) the mother’s presence in the U.S. was lawful but temporary and the father was not a U.S. citizen or LPR. The order was issued on the alleged basis that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not confer birthright citizenship on such children because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the constitutional sense.
Three families challenged the order on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. One class representative is Barbara, a Honduran asylum applicant whose child is due in October 2025. Another is Susan, a Taiwanese citizen in the country on a student visa whose daughter was born in April 2025; her child’s passport application was in progress at the time of the suit. The third is Mark, a Brazilian applicant for permanent residence whose son was born in March 2025 and initially received a U.S. passport. These families filed suit under pseudonyms, alleging that the Executive Order unlawfully strips their children of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). They seek to preserve access to citizenship-related benefits including Social Security, SNAP, and Medicaid.
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and before a ruling from that court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Question
Is a presidential executive order that denies U.S. birthright citizenship to children born in the United States because their parents are unlawfully present or in the country on temporary visas consistent with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)?
[24-7351] Pitchford v. Cain
Pitchford v. Cain Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2026. Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections. Advocates: Joseph J. Perkovich (for …
Notas del episodio
Pitchford v. Cain
Argued on Mar 31, 2026.
Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.
Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections.Advocates:
- Joseph J. Perkovich (for the Petitioner)
- Scott G. Stewart (for the Respondents)
- Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory.
The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual.
Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes.
Question
Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?
[25-83] Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Adrian Jules.Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Daniel L …
Notas del episodio
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties
Argued on Mar 30, 2026.
Petitioner: Adrian Jules.
Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties.Advocates:
- Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)
- Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district.
Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
Question
Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?
[25-5146] Abouammo v. United States
Abouammo v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tobias S. Loss-Eaton (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang …
Notas del episodio
Abouammo v. United States
Argued on Mar 30, 2026.
Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
- Tobias S. Loss-Eaton (for the Petitioner)
- Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 2013, Twitter hired Ahmad Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager responsible for high-profile users in the Middle East and North Africa. Through this role, he became involved with Bader Binasaker, a close aide to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Beginning in 2014, Abouammo used his access to Twitter’s proprietary tools to gather nonpublic information—including email addresses, phone numbers, and IP data—about Saudi dissident Twitter users, particularly accounts critical of the Saudi royal family. He transmitted this information to Binasaker—circumstantially inferred through encrypted messaging services—and was rewarded with lavish gifts, including a luxury Hublot watch, and over $300,000 in wire transfers to a Lebanese bank account held in his father’s name. Communication between the two included expressions of intent to “delete evil,” suggesting the sensitive nature of their collaboration.
After leaving Twitter in 2015, Abouammo continued to facilitate communication between Saudi representatives and Twitter, allegedly under the guise of social media consulting. In October 2018, FBI agents approached him as part of an investigation into unauthorized access of Twitter accounts connected to Saudi espionage. During the interview at his Seattle home, Abouammo denied wrongdoing and claimed he was paid for legitimate consulting. While the agents waited in his home, Abouammo fabricated an invoice to substantiate this claim and emailed it to them. The actions connected to the allegedly falsified document—including the questioning, fabrication, and transmission—all took place in Seattle. The agents who received the document, though physically present in Seattle at the time, worked out of the FBI field office in San Francisco.
A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for falsifying a record with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, among other charges. Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count for improper venue, arguing that all relevant conduct occurred in Seattle. The district court denied the motion, holding venue proper in the Northern District because the statute required an intent to obstruct an investigation based there. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that venue is proper in a district where the obstructed investigation occurred, even if none of the defendant’s physical conduct took place there.
Question
Is venue proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there?
[24-935] Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock
Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2026. Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.Respondent: Angelo Brock. Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners) Jennifer D …
Notas del episodio
Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock
Argued on Mar 25, 2026.
Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Angelo Brock.Advocates:
- Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners)
- Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law.
Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision.
Question
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?
[25-5] Noem v. Al Otro Lado
Noem v. Al Otro Lado Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the …
Notas del episodio
Noem v. Al Otro Lado
Argued on Mar 24, 2026.
Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation.Advocates:
- Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners)
- Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks.
While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials.
Question
Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?
[25-6] Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre …
Notas del episodio
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated
Argued on Mar 24, 2026.
Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.
Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated.Advocates:
- Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner)
- Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur)
- William M. Jay (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability.
Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case.
BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions.
Question
May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?
[24-1260] Watson v. Republican National Committee
Watson v. Republican National Committee Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al. Advocates …
Notas del episodio
Watson v. Republican National Committee
Argued on Mar 23, 2026.
Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.
Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al.Advocates:
- Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner)
- Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
- D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states.
In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day.
Question
Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?
[24-1238] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2026. Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) …
Notas del episodio
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
Argued on Mar 4, 2026.
Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.
Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC.Advocates:
- Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)
- Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents)
- Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance.
Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier.
The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim.
Question
Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?
[24-1063] Hunter v. United States
Hunter v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2026. Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the …
Notas del episodio
Hunter v. United States
Argued on Mar 3, 2026.
Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.
Respondent: United States of America.Advocates:
- Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)
- Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician.
Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty.
Question
1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum?
2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?
[24-1234] United States v. Hemani
United States v. Hemani Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2026. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Erin E. Murphy (for …
Notas del episodio
United States v. Hemani
Argued on Mar 2, 2026.
Petitioner: United States of America.
Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani.Advocates:
- Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner)
- Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine.
The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession.
Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional.
Question
Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?
[25-95] Pung v. Isabella County
Pung v. Isabella County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.Respondent: sabella County, Michigan. Advocates …
Notas del episodio
Pung v. Isabella County
Argued on Feb 25, 2026.
Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.
Respondent: sabella County, Michigan.Advocates:
- Philip L. Ellison (for the Petitioner)
- Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party)
- Matthew T. Nelson (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded.
Question
1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction?
2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?
[24-783] Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2026. Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the …
Notas del episodio
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel
Argued on Feb 24, 2026.
Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.
Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan.Advocates:
- John J. Bursch (for the Petitioners)
- Ann M. Sherman (for the Respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties.
On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge.
After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court.
Question
Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?
[24-699] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. Advocates: Morgan L …
Notas del episodio
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba)
Argued on Feb 23, 2026.
Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.
Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al.Advocates:
- Morgan L. Ratner (for the Petitioner)
- Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
- Jules L. Lobel (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day.
Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods.
The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery.
Question
Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
[24-983] Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al. Advocates …
Notas del episodio
Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
Argued on Feb 23, 2026.
Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.
Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al.Advocates:
- Richard D. Klingler (for the Petitioner)
- Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
- Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019.
The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001.
Question
Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?
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