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3.226 Fall and Rise of China: The Race for Rangoon

2 novembre 2026 · 37 min

Notes de l’épisode

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Burma. Burma, culturally tied to South-East Asia, had been absorbed into British India through nineteenth-century wars, breeding lasting nationalist resentment and a hunger for independence. When Japan entered the war in December 1941, Britain's regional defenses collapsed almost overnight—Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk, Malaya crumbling, and Burma left thinly defended by a single division stretched across an enormous frontier. Japan invaded methodically, having spent months on reconnaissance and jungle training. Colonel Suzuki recruited Aung San's "Thirty Comrades" into the Burma Independence Army, which fought alongside Japanese troops for political rather than military effect. The 143rd Regiment landed first, meeting fierce Thai resistance at some beaches before Thailand reversed course and allied with Japan. Victoria Point fell without a fight, though two British officials there vanished into Japanese custody under murky, possibly grim circumstances. A British sabotage raid against Japanese rail bridges failed for lack of accurate maps. Wavell, newly responsible for Burma, found promised reinforcements diverted to Malaya, leaving the colony dangerously exposed as the invasion gathered pace.

#226 The Race for Rangoon

Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.

While Victoria Point had fallen without resistance, the Japanese were about to prove that no terrain, however forbidding, would be allowed to stall their advance. Meanwhile, some 1,500 men of the 3rd/2nd Battalion Group, under the command of Major Oki, set out from Bangkok on 3 January with orders to take Tavoy. It was a plan of characteristic audacity. The force travelled first by train to Kanchanaburi, aided by the local BIA contingent, then pushed upriver by motor-boat along the notorious River Kwai to Wanpo. From there, they turned to face the real obstacle: the steep, jungle-smothered Tenasserim Range separating Thailand from Burma.

There were no maps, no trails—only a route an advance party had scouted as difficult but not impossible. Each man carried seven days' rations along with either 120 rounds of ammunition or a fourteen-pound mountain artillery shell, on top of his standard kit. Oxen supplemented the Japanese horses in hauling the heavier loads, while several elephants, lent by the Thai army, led the column—their surprising agility over rough ground proving invaluable—with engineers following behind to hack out a path.

Progress was brutal. Horses and oxen collapsed and were lost along the way, leeches tormented the men without pause, and the column crawled forward at barely two miles a day. Rations dwindled to the point that pack animals were slaughtered and their loads abandoned. But on 14 January, they finally crested the range, and the terrain eased. By the 15th, they broke free of the forest onto open grassland, with the village of Myitta before them—and beyond it, a motor road leading over one last, gentler ridge to Tavoy, still 34 miles distant. Tavoy itself was no minor outpost—a town of 30,000, defended by the 6th Burma Rifles, one of the newly raised battalions, bolstered on the eve of battle by two companies of the 3rd Burma Rifles arriving by boat from Mergui. The defenders held an outpost at Myitta and a fortified position astride the road on the ridge behind it. When the outpost opened fire on the approaching Japanese on the 16th before falling back, the invaders occupied Myitta unopposed, resting through the following day.

That evening, under cover of darkness, they resumed their advance—and roughly two hours later collided with the British position. Japanese scouts drew fire, losing three men, but the response was swift and overwhelming: machine-gun bursts and five rounds from a mountain gun sent the Burma Rifles into retreat and the village into Japanese hands. Rattled by wild rumors and expecting the worst, the three forward companies abandoned their planned fallback position at Wagon entirely, dissolving into the jungle and striking out for Moulmein—some 200 miles to the north. On the 18th, the Japanese pressed on in daylight, cloaking men and horses alike in cut branches to evade detection. Twice they froze as British aircraft passed overhead, apparently unseen, before making camp just short of Tavoy to prepare for the final assault.

By now, the town's defense had thinned dramatically—down to a single company of the 6th Burma Rifles, two companies from the 3rd, and detachments from the Kokine Battalion and the Tenasserim Battalion of the Burma Auxiliary Force. When the attack came around 9am on the 19th, it opened against the airfield, where the police detachment fought with real spirit, and briefly held the line at one point in the main perimeter—inflicting casualties the Japanese themselves acknowledged. But as his officers fell one by one, Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton read the situation clearly: his men could not hold much longer. Just past midday, he gave the order to evacuate.

The Burma Auxiliary Force detachment carried out the demolitions with remarkable composure even as the position disintegrated around them, while a rumor of massive Japanese reinforcements sent most of the remaining Burma Rifles fleeing into the forest, bound for home rather than the front. What remained of Cotton's force withdrew up the road and was recovered some twenty miles north by the 4th/12th Frontier Force Regiment, dispatched from Moulmein in support.

By 3pm, Tavoy belonged to the Japanese. The entire operation had cost them just 23 dead and 40 wounded—a remarkably light price for the town they'd won. Trailing in their wake, a BIA detachment under Captain Kawashima moved quickly to establish an autonomous administration and begin recruiting volunteers; within two weeks, they claimed, the town had returned to normal. The Burma Rifles units involved suffered a collapse in morale they never truly recovered from, and the damage spread to other units besides. Worse, it planted a lasting image—of Japanese forces materializing without warning from supposedly impassable jungle—that would haunt British and Burmese forces for months to come.

Yet the psychological toll on Burmese troops demands more sympathy than judgment. A powerful independence movement, and with it a current of anti-British, pro-Japanese sentiment, had been building among Burma's politically engaged classes—and it swelled with every British setback and Japanese advance. For any soldier associated with the losing side, the calculus was becoming brutally clear: defeat meant danger for himself, and worse, it meant leaving his family exposed and friendless in a land about to change hands. Under that kind of pressure, the temptation to desert and return home was only growing stronger.

With Tavoy secured, the 3rd/2nd Battalion turned north along the coast road toward Moulmein—only to find the town had already fallen the day before their arrival. Mergui was now isolated, cut off from any hope of relief. Originally defended by the 2nd Burma Rifles Battalion along with two companies of the 3rd, the garrison had been bled dry when those companies were diverted to Tavoy's defense. On the 19th, Army Headquarters in Rangoon recognized the position was untenable and ordered the garrison, along with non-Burmese civilians, evacuated by sea to Rangoon. Valuable stockpiles of rubber and tungsten had already been shipped out ahead of them. The withdrawal proceeded on the 20th and 22nd, the power station and other key installations reduced to rubble behind them. Both Victoria Point and Mergui endured Japanese bombing—Mergui considerably more so—yet at neither location did ground forces ever actually meet the enemy. Running alongside these military maneuvers was a quieter but equally consequential campaign: Colonel Suzuki's Burma Independence Army trailing in the wake of Japanese advances, moving into Victoria Point, Mergui, and Tavoy to establish control, swell its ranks with new recruits, and free the Japanese regulars to push on and rejoin the main force.

Japan, recognizing air power would be decisive, shifted an air division from Manchuria to Thailand to strike Rangoon. On 23 December, 87 bombers with 34 fighter escorts hit Rangoon and nearby Mingaladon airfield—deliberately targeting the city itself rather than the docks or refineries, aiming to terrorize civilians and drive off laborers. With no shelters and crowds watching from the streets, casualties were heavy, triggering a mass exodus: Burmese fled to their villages, Indian dockworkers began the long trek toward India. A second, larger raid on Christmas Day (67 bombers, 32 fighters, 25 Oscars) pushed even more people to flee. Burma had no anti-aircraft guns and only weak air defenses—18 outdated Buffaloes and 21 AVG Tomahawks—but a functioning Observer Corps and one working radar gave enough warning to intercept both raids effectively. The defenders shot down ten bombers and five fighters while losing only ten aircraft themselves, an unexpectedly costly outcome for the Japanese.

Reinforcement arrived from India on 31 December in the form of the 8th Heavy and 3rd Indian Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries—desperately needed, since the combined RAF and AVG squadrons had dwindled to just 29 aircraft against a Japanese force exceeding 150. On 4 January, defenders successfully turned back a raid of 21 Japanese fighters, and a lull settled in, broken only by occasional night nuisance raids. For the time being, Allied airmen had done the improbable: they'd made the Japanese think twice. It bought something invaluable—a window in which troopships could slip in and land reinforcements Burma desperately needed, unmolested from above.

Hutton, newly arrived with Chief of Staff Brigadier 'Taffy' Davies, assessed Burma's defense problem in early January. The frontier with Thailand ran for hundreds of miles, but only a few routes crossed the Salween River: tracks from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai in the north (long, hilly, and partly reduced to pack-animal trails), a forest road from Phitsanulok over the Dawna Range to Kawkareik and Rangoon, and a mule trail from Kanchanaburi through the Three Pagodas Pass to Moulmein. Rangoon was the linchpin—Burma's main city, port, and industrial center, and the gateway to the Burma Road supplying China (whose continued resistance tied down half of Japan's army). But that same road ran exposed along the frontier for 700 miles, vulnerable to being cut. Unable to defend everywhere, Hutton judged the main Japanese thrust would come through Raheng toward Rangoon, and committed accordingly: a light force in the north near Toungoo, relying on Chinese support; acceptance that Tenasserim in the south couldn't be held and should only be delayed; and the bulk of his effort directed at the Raheng approach. He ordered 16 Brigade to Kawkareik to cover it, and on 9 January, Major-General Smyth VC arrived to take command of the 17th Indian Division, moving forward to Moulmein to oversee both the 2nd Burma Brigade and the incoming 16 Brigade.

'Jackie' Smyth was a decorated and highly regarded Indian Army officer—a VC winner from World War One, later earning a Military Cross on the North-West Frontier, and one of the few chosen for the elite Staff College course at Camberley, where he became close with Lord Gort. That friendship paid off: when Gort became BEF Commander-in-Chief, Smyth got a frontline brigade command in France, serving through Dunkirk before Auchinleck brought him back to India with a promised division. He briefly commanded the 18th (later 19th) Indian Division before being tapped in January 1942 to lead the 17th Indian Division into Burma. At 48, Smyth had courage, training, and charisma—seemingly the ideal commander. But he was secretly unwell: a bout of malaria and a severe anal fissure that summer, plus dyspepsia symptoms possibly masking a mild heart attack. Reassured he'd recover, he'd accepted the 18th Division command; by the time Wavell offered him Burma, he felt sick again but assumed it was flu. Unable to turn down such a critical posting without appearing to lose his nerve, he said nothing and hoped for the best—then spent a week in bed recovering while his staff deployed to Burma ahead of him.

On 16 January, the 46th Indian Infantry Brigade came ashore at Rangoon and was sent forward to the Bilin River, likewise placed under Smyth's command. He now had three infantry brigades at his disposal, along with three Sapper and Miner field companies—the 1st Burma, 24th Bombay, and 60th Madras. What he lacked was any field artillery worth the name: his only fire support came from the 5th and 12th Indian Mountain Batteries and a lone section of four Bofors guns from the 3rd Indian LAA Battery. And this modest force was expected to cover a stretch of frontier running from Mergui in the south to Papun in the north—some four hundred miles in all.

Hutton's plan to redistribute his forces took time to unfold, made no easier by Japanese bombers, which repeatedly struck Martaban, Kyondo, and above all Moulmein during these weeks. Even without enemy interference, the logistics alone were formidable. A railway did connect Rangoon to Martaban, opposite Moulmein on the Salween's northern bank, but it ran on metre-gauge track, mostly single line, with painfully limited capacity. There was no through road at all, since the only bridge spanning the Sittang River belonged to the railway. A metalled road existed for much of the distance, but for fifteen miles on either side of the Sittang bridge, it dissolved into a dusty track, useless the moment rain fell. Most vehicles, as a result, had no choice but to travel by rail, while three ferries across the Sittang could shift only a limited number more. Further ferries were needed again at Martaban to cross the Salween estuary into Moulmein, and two more beyond that for anyone continuing on to Kawkareik—rickety country-boat crossings capable of moving roughly one vehicle an hour. It was, in short, a wholly inadequate lifeline for a force that depended on motor transport to fight.

Since early December, the approach from Raheng had been watched over by the 4th Battalion, Burma Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Abernethy—a battalion belonging to 2 Burma Brigade, whose headquarters sat some eighty miles away in Moulmein. The battalion held the tangle of tracks crossing the densely forested Dawna Range toward Kawkareik, a small town set back from the border itself. Malaria had already thinned its ranks to barely two-thirds strength. To reinforce this thin screen, Smyth ordered 16 Brigade, under Brigadier J.K. 'Jonah' Jones, forward to Kawkareik to relieve 4 Burif. But recognizing the value of 4 Burif's hard-won local knowledge—and wanting to speed the whole movement along—he instead kept the battalion in place under 16 Brigade's command, and shifted the 4th/12th Frontier Force Regiment across to 2 Burma Brigade in its stead.

16 Brigade was also tasked with covering the approach to Moulmein via the Three Pagodas Pass, eighty miles south of Kawkareik—a job handed to a company of the 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles. Meanwhile, a company of the 1st Royal Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment, was sent to escort a section of mountain guns moving by road to Kawkareik, though this group was recalled before covering much ground. As a result, neither the Jat company nor the Gurkha company would see action in the fighting soon to come at Kawkareik or Moulmein.

With these arrangements settled, Smyth shifted his own headquarters back to Kyaikto, roughly midway between the Bilin and Sittang rivers. Between the 8th and 15th, 16 Brigade made its way by river steamer up the Gyaing to Kyondo, then onward by truck—of which there were few, this being essentially a marching brigade—along the long route via Metheraw to the Haungtharaw river ferry at Kya-in.

While the British pieced together their defense, the Japanese were assembling their own machine with characteristic thoroughness. The Imperial Guards Division had crossed into Thailand from Cambodia back on 9 December, establishing a presence in Bangkok, and remained there until 55 Division arrived to take over—at which point the Guards, leaving behind a single battalion for internal security amid a string of anti-Japanese incidents, moved south to join the invasion of Malaya.

55 Division, tasked with spearheading the drive into Burma, moved its 112 Regiment (minus the battalion already committed at Tavoy) from Saigon to Bangkok by road and rail at the close of December. Alongside it, 143 Regiment—which had come ashore earlier across the Kra Isthmus beaches—rejoined the division with two of its three battalions, the third having been diverted to Victoria Point. On 28 December, an advance party—a platoon of infantry alongside a BIA contingent, led by the commanding officer of the 2nd/2nd Battalion—set off for Mae Sot, a Thai village hard against the Burmese border, to scout the crossing of the Dawna Range toward Kawkareik. The rest of 55 Division followed by rail to Phitsanulok, then by divisional transport to Raheng, roughly forty miles short of Mae Sot.

The Raheng–Mae Sot route crossed jungle-covered hills via a footpath impassable to vehicles, forcing the Japanese to rely on horses, elephants, and oxen while troops manhandled heavy loads (even bicycles) over four grueling days. By mid-January the 112th Regiment had arrived at Mae Sot, followed by most of the 143rd and, by the 19th, 55 Division's headquarters. With BIA assistance, the Japanese scouted multiple crossing points beyond the main Miyawadi–Kawkareik road: the Kyawku pass to the north (via Nabu and Mepale) and the Kwingale pass to the south. General Takeuchi advanced mainly along the main road and the southern Kwingale route, sending only a patrol north. Specifically, 112th Regiment's 2nd Battalion took the main road while its 1st Battalion crossed further north at Yebu; the reconnaissance regiment pushed south through Palu and Kwingale toward Myohaung; and the 143rd Regiment stayed in reserve at Mae Sot. On the British side, Brigadier J.K. Jones, leading 16 Brigade, set up headquarters at milestone 22, north of Kawkareik, to prepare for the Japanese advance along the difficult 38-mile frontier road—a steep, jungle-choked climb that only leveled into open ground near Miyawadi.

By 20 January, 4 Burif had two companies watching the northern tracks—one at Nabu, one between Mepale and Tichara—while its headquarters and a third company held milestone 18, and a fourth sat in reserve at 'Misty Hollow,' awaiting relief by a company of the 1st/7th Gurkhas. Misty Hollow was a small plateau where vehicles and mules could shelter off the road, roughly four miles from the crest of the range. The Gurkhas themselves had one company and battalion headquarters at the main position, milestone 36, with a second com

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