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3.213 Fall and Rise of China: The Last Struggle Around Yichang

3 août 2026 · 38 min

Notes de l’épisode

Last time we spoke about autumn battle of Changsha. In late September and early October 1941, the Chinese commander Chen Cheng focused on Yichang, a crucial Yangtze stronghold whose loss would threaten China's position and the approach toward Chongqing. Chen Cheng's plan tightened a ring around the city while Chinese forces blocked Japanese reinforcement routes, including efforts to cut retreat lines at places like Jingmen and Dangyang. The battle's pressure was intensified by shifting momentum elsewhere. As the Japanese situation around Changsha became unstable—strained by supplies, exhaustion, and mounting casualties—the Japanese command began to withdraw north. Chiang Kai-shek used this to accelerate Chinese priorities, ordering rapid capture of Yichang within a tight deadline. Inside Yichang, the defense turned tragic as Japanese troops faced encirclement, heavy artillery barrages, and desperate street fighting.

#213 Blood, Rain, and Flags: The Last Struggle Around Yichang

Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.

While the struggle around Changsha occupied one half of the battlefield, another contest of equal consequence was taking shape farther west at Yichang. The two operations were not separate stories. They belonged to the same campaign, and each influenced the fate of the other. If Changsha was the city whose danger was plain to every observer, Yichang was the stronghold whose importance weighed most heavily on the calculations of commanders. In the autumn of 1941, the outcome in one place could not be understood without the other. For Chen Cheng, Yichang was more than a military objective. It was a wound that had never closed.

The city stood on the Yangtze at a point of major strategic value, tied not only to communications and transport but also to the defense of the river approach toward the wartime capital. When Yichang had fallen in June 1940, it had done more than alter the front line. It had left behind humiliation. Three Japanese divisions—the 3rd, 13th, and 39th—had seized the city after twelve days and nights of intense fighting. At five in the afternoon on June 11, a unit of the Japanese 13th Division under Tanaka Seiichi had broken in from the southeast. Chinese troops of the 18th Army under Peng Shan and Luo Guangwen's 18th Division fought a savage close-quarters battle inside the city for a full day and night, while Japanese forces of the 3rd and 39th Divisions pressed from the north. At four in the afternoon on June 12, with Deng Ping's battalion covering the withdrawal, the Chinese finally pulled out and Yichang was lost. Men in high command do not always remember defeat in the same way as the men who fight through it. Soldiers tend to remember heat, hunger, the dead, or the exact corner where a friend fell. Commanders also remember those things, but they remember something else as well: failure recorded in the language of responsibility. Chen Cheng could not forget that twenty Chinese corps had been beaten by three Japanese divisions. At the time, Li Zongren had commanded the operation. Now the chance to erase that old disgrace seemed to be passing into Chen Cheng's own hands.

On September 20, he received two telegrams, one from the Military Commission and one from Chiang Kai-shek himself. From that point onward, Yichang dominated his thoughts. By September 23, the Military Commission approved Chen's request to transfer the 33rd Army Group of the Fifth War Zone into the Sixth War Zone for the coming attack. On paper, his position seemed powerful. He now had fourteen divisions at his disposal. Yichang itself was held only by Uchiyama Eitaro's 13th Division and the Hayabuchi Detachment, together amounting to roughly sixteen thousand men. Even granting the usual Japanese superiority in training, firepower, communications, and local tactical cohesion, the Chinese possessed absolute numerical advantage.

By September 28, the Chinese units had reached their attack positions, and Chen Cheng set his operational design in motion. The forces on the right bank were to attack first and pull the main body of the Japanese 39th Division southward. The 33rd Army would strike toward Jingmen and Dangyang in order to cut off the enemy's routes of retreat and reinforcement. Once these movements took hold, Yichang itself would be enclosed and crushed. Li Jilan's 94th Army, Li Yannian's 2nd Army, Song Kentang's 32nd Army, and other formations advanced according to plan. On paper the arrangement had clarity. On the ground it had resistance. The Japanese defended from strong fieldworks, and progress came slowly. Earthworks, wire, trenches, and mutually supporting positions transformed every apparent advance into hard labor. The Chinese pushed forward, but not with the speed Chen Cheng wanted. Even a favorable comparison of troop numbers could not cancel the fact that an entrenched Japanese force, once determined to hold, could impose a terrible price on assault.

By October 1, Japanese troops outside Yichang began withdrawing into the city proper. Chen Cheng responded by ordering all troops to complete the encirclement. At last the operation seemed to be reaching the decisive stage. The city was tightening under pressure. The ring was nearly closed. Yet at that very moment time began pressing harder on both sides.

On October 2, both Chen Cheng outside the city and Uchiyama inside it received telegrams that sharpened the crisis. The message sent from the Japanese 11th Army headquarters in Wuhan informed Uchiyama that the famous Tokyo Asakusa Art Troupe was coming to Yichang to comfort the front-line troops. The Expeditionary Army Headquarters in Nanjing had decided that, for political reasons, the troupe could not be turned back merely because combat conditions were dangerous. Their purpose was morale. That such a message could arrive at such a time reveals much about Japanese wartime culture. Appearances, spirit, ritual reassurance, and the emotional theater of endurance still had to be maintained even when military reality was worsening by the hour. The telegram that Chen Cheng received was very different.

Chiang Kai-shek's order stated with brutal directness: the Japanese in northern Hunan had begun to withdraw, and Chen was ordered to spare no effort to capture Yichang within three days. Chen stared at the message for a long time. There was no need for explanation. He understood at once what Chiang meant. The battle for Yichang had already consumed days of hard fighting. Chinese units had suffered substantial losses. But the essential fact stood over every map and every order: if Japanese forces disengaging from northern Hunan reached Yichang in time to reinforce it, then all the effort already expended might amount to nothing. The battle had become not only a contest of strength, but a race.

At nearly the same time, the command post of the Japanese 11th Army at Yueyang was confronting the other half of the same problem. On the night of September 30, the headquarters was brightly lit as Chief of Staff Isamu Kinoshita arranged reports, reconnaissance findings, and field messages before the army commander. The Japanese still possessed a valuable advantage: they had access to Chinese communication codes. But such intelligence could not solve every operational problem. It could not conjure food where there was none, restore exhausted bodies, or stop the battlefield from changing shape. By then the Japanese situation around Changsha had become increasingly unstable. The Hayabuchi Detachment, after entering the city, was entangled in fierce urban fighting with the Chinese 6th Provisional Division of the 79th Army. By the evening of September 30, neither side had eliminated the other inside the city. Outside Changsha, the Japanese 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 40th Divisions had assembled and kept major Chinese forces at bay. One element of the 3rd Division had even moved south by truck to Zhuzhou, fifty kilometers away, and occupied the abandoned city. Yet these outward signs of success concealed a serious weakness.

The Japanese rear was fraying. Ammunition and food were running low. Divisions operating that deep in hostile territory could not sustain a prolonged campaign under such conditions. More than ten days of uninterrupted movement and fighting had also produced rising non-combat casualties. Men were collapsing from fatigue along the march. Sickness increased steadily. Units that had looked formidable on the offensive were beginning to wear thin from inside. At the same time, Chinese remnants from earlier defeats, new reinforcements, and formations that had regrouped after being thrown back were all watching for signs of weakness. Even if the Japanese divisions in Hunan still had the strength to fight several more actions, another question overrode everything else: Yichang.

Yichang was not simply another point on the map. It was a strategic stronghold on the Yangtze and one of the key places from which Japan threatened Chongqing. The city also carried institutional memory. After its capture in June 1940, the occupying troops had initially been ordered to withdraw for rest and reorganization. But Imperial General Headquarters had reversed that decision almost at once and demanded that Yichang be held after all. Troops already on the road had to turn back and retake a city that had been burned, stripped, and rendered difficult to occupy. Among those who had insisted most strongly that Yichang must be retained was Anami Korechika, then vice minister of the army. Now Anami faced the consequence of that earlier insistence. However attractive the gains in Hunan might appear, Yichang could not simply be sacrificed. Uchiyama's 13th Division was not strong enough to hold indefinitely without relief. Anami looked at Hunan on the map—a rich province, beautiful and militarily tempting, much of it seeming almost within reach. But strategy does not reward attachment. With great reluctance, he gave the order to retreat. On the morning of October 1, all Japanese divisions received the reversal instructions, and at four in the afternoon they began moving north.

For Xue Yue, this altered the entire meaning of the campaign. Since the beginning of the battle, he had known frustration, disappointment, and anger. Whatever private calculations he may have made about Chiang Kai-shek's strategic direction, Chen Cheng's political influence, his own mistakes in the earlier phase of operations, or the rivalries that had long poisoned Republican military life, none of those feelings prevented him from seeing the opportunity now before him. Once the Japanese turned north, pursuit was no longer merely a matter of salvaging dignity. It became an operational necessity tied directly to Yichang.

His staff quickly drafted a pursuit order defining routes, timings, and methods. The document explicitly called for tracking and pursuing, interception, flanking movement, ambush, and surprise attack. This was not to be a ceremonial following of a retreating enemy at a respectful distance. It was meant to be pressure—enough pressure, if possible, to delay Japanese movement back toward Hubei. Two hours after Xue issued the order, another telegram arrived from Chongqing. Chiang Kai-shek instructed that since the enemy which had advanced into northern Hunan had begun retreating toward Yueyang on the night of October 1, the Ninth War Zone was to exploit their fatigue, pursue boldly, seize Yueyang if possible, sabotage the Wuyue Railway, and launch attacks, ambushes, and fierce strikes along the retreat route to prevent the Japanese from regaining their former defenses or shifting quickly toward Wuhan. The purpose was stated clearly: to facilitate the operations of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth War Zones.

Xue Yue understood the message at once. The support provided by the Third and Fifth War Zones had been limited and often symbolic. The operation that truly mattered now was Chen Cheng's assault on Yichang. Pursuit in Hunan was not simply retaliation for the threat to Changsha. It was an attempt to buy time in blood, mud, and delay. He adjusted the pursuit deployment and ordered commanders at every level to go forward and supervise their units in person. Autumn rain began to fall over northern Hunan. Hills disappeared in mist and drizzle. Along the roads leading north moved Japanese soldiers under the Rising Sun flag; behind them and beside them, often through fields, villages, and broken country, moved Chinese troops under the Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth flag. Their uniforms differed, their languages differed, their causes differed—but the exhaustion in their faces must often have looked terribly alike. Both armies moved through damp air, hunger, uncertainty, and the constant expectation of another clash. The pursuit, however, revealed the limits of Chinese strength as well as its persistence.

On October 2, the battered remnants of the Chinese 74th and 26th Armies cleared battlefields along the Liuyang and Laodao Rivers and found no Japanese left there. The 74th withdrew to Liling to regroup. The 26th halted at Changle Street for replenishment. Yang Sen sent the whole 27th Army Group after the retreating enemy. Ou Zhen's 4th Army attempted to intercept the Japanese 40th Division, but the Japanese maneuvered skillfully and escaped. Ou Zhen pursued them north of the Miluo River for three days, reached the Changshui River, and found the south bank empty. The 20th Army tried to cut off the Japanese 6th Division at Fulipu. At first they could not even locate the enemy, but they did collect large amounts of matériel left behind. Deputy Commander Xia Jiong remarked, with rough optimism, that the Japanese were still "steaming hot" and would certainly be caught. His men ran hard, crossed the Miluo River, and finally did catch a rearguard. Yet the Japanese, intent only on getting away, adopted what Chinese accounts described as a low-key method of not retaliating and not becoming decisively engaged. After crossing Gaoqiao they withdrew into their previous defensive area, and Xia could do little more than stop, rest, and continue to watch them.

The 58th Army intercepted more than two thousand Japanese troops near Guanwang Bridge. For a moment it seemed a major clash might erupt. Instead the Japanese fled, leaving behind large quantities of supplies. The Chinese followed them as far as Taolin and then halted when it became clear that the enemy had regained strong ground. These episodes were frustrating, but they were not meaningless. They showed that many Chinese formations had been too badly mauled in the earlier phase of the campaign to sustain relentless offensive pressure. They also showed that the Japanese, though in retreat, were still disciplined enough to avoid disastrous entanglements while shedding matériel to gain speed.

The Chinese units that struck hardest during this phase were not those most damaged at the beginning of the battle, but fresher formations such as Xia Chuzhong's 79th Army and Fu Zhongfang's 99th Army. Xia's men ambushed the Hayabuchi Detachment and nearly destroyed it, killing two of its three battalion commanders. Fu's 99th Army fought a series of clashes with the Japanese 3rd and 6th Divisions and with the Hirano and Araki Detachments. The Japanese, eager to keep moving, absorbed losses rather than pause for extended battle. The 99th Army captured so much matériel that transporting it became a problem in itself. On October 4, a squad leader of the 197th Division even shot down an aircraft with machine-gun fire. Yet even here success had limits. By October 9, the entire Japanese force in northern Hunan had crossed the Xinqiang River and reoccupied its original positions. Chinese attacks achieved nothing decisive. The river once again became, in military imagination, almost a fixed frontier. As gunfire subsided in Xiangbei, all attention turned toward Yichang.

The encirclement of the city was completed at noon on October 4. Chen Cheng ordered a general offensive to begin at four in the morning on October 6. Outside the city, Li Yannian's 2nd Army held fast against the Japanese 39th Division, which was trying to come in from Jingmen. Altogether, the Sixth War Zone had committed fourteen divisions—more than one hundred thousand men—to the operation. What followed was the familiar but always arresting spectacle of a great battle gathering itself. Small detachments moved forward to cut wire and destroy fortifications outside the city. Artillery officers adjusted their fire with care. Ammunition boxes changed hands continuously. Telephone operators hurried back and forth laying lines. Engineers worked with picks and shovels. Trucks forced their way down crowded roads with horns blaring. Boats were requisitioned along the riverbank, and dark-skinned boatmen weathered by the Yangtze wind moved among soldiers and officers. Behind the assault units stood medical stations under Red Cross flags, waiting for the wounded they knew were coming. All the machinery of battle was in motion.

Inside Yichang, meanwhile, another scene unfolded that could only exist in wartime Japan's peculiar mixture of militarism and performance. At the field hospital of the Japanese 13th Division on the campus of Mingde Middle School, wounded soldiers wrapped in white bandages stood, sat, lay on stretchers, or leaned on medical orderlies in the yard watching entertainers from home perform while the dull rhythms of artillery sounded in the distance. The Asakusa Art Troupe had been founded in the mid-1920s and had made its name by combining modern popular elements with traditional stage culture. It had first won over ordinary audiences and then, as its reputation rose, gained acceptance among official and elite circles as well. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it was gradually folded into the machinery of wartime propaganda, performing works meant to praise sacrifice, glorify the empire, and strengthen morale.

When the delegation of more than thirty members arrived at the 11th Army headquarters in Wuhan, the army added a military band of more than twenty men to accompany them to Yichang. But by the time they reached the city, the battle had already drawn close. They could not visit forward positions. Instead they performed for the wounded. The last performance featured heavily made-up young men and women dancing a popular folk number. As the dance continued, the women bowed and invited medics and wounded men who could still move to join them. Kimono and military uniform mixed. Smiles appeared beside bandages. Music from the home islands drifted out beneath the sound of an approaching siege. Then war interrupted the scene completely.

Before dawn on October 6, Chinese artillery opened on Yichang with a deafening bombardment, and the cries of attack rolled over the city. As day came up, the troupe members watched stretchers being rushed into the field hospital where they had only recently performed. One of the sixteen-year-old twin geisha sisters, Mihoko, asked the troupe

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