#387 Can Potential Vertical Integration Harm Be (Silver) Screened Horizontally?

Vertical merger review has long rested on the principle that competitive harm is most likely when a merged firm has both the ability and incentive to foreclose rivals, yet courts and enforcers often struggle to establish that harm empirically. But can potentially anticompetitive vertical integrations be screened in advance using observable market characteristics? Charles Hodgson, Assistant Professor of Economics at Yale University and Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER, and Shilong Sun, Senior Economist at Compass Lexecon, join Anora Wang and Panos Dimitrellos to discuss how evidence from the Chinese film industry sheds light on when vertical foreclosure is likely to emerge, why downstream concentration and upstream product substitutability matter, and how these findings may inform modern merger review across industries ranging from movie theaters to digital platforms. Listen to this episode to learn more about how a practical screening framework for vertical mergers could help identify when foreclosure concerns are most likely to arise and provide enforcers and practitioners with a more evidence-based approach to assessing competitive harm.

With special guests:
Charles Hodgson, Professor, Yale and Shilong Sun, Dr., Compass Lexecon

Related Links:

• Charles Hodgson bio
• Shilong Sun bio
• Heterogeneity in Vertical Foreclosure: Evidence from the Chinese Film Industry

Hosted by:
Panos Dimitrellos, Secretariat Economists and Anora Wang, Arnold & Porter