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EU ESG Ratings Regulations, plus Zuckerberg's new shares

22 de outubro de 2026 · 54 min

Notas do episódio

This is Proxy Countdown. Welcome to the big show for the week of October 19, 2026 alongside my tag team partner Matt Moscardi. I'm Damion Rallis. On today’s countdown: Zuck does what’s best for Zuck, part 8,000 The Copart CEO dresses like Elon Musk for Halloween A former Disney CEO is being paid to hang around and be ready to do something Some quirks at upcoming annual meetings And on the Big Vote, Matt talks EU regulations Trade Wire Top Stories: 36 Filings since October 13th The headlines Meta (Zuck) is creating a new share of stock (Class C for Clown) with zero voting power, meaning Mark Zuckerberg keeps total control of the company, etc. Non-Zuck Class A shareholders essentially get a 2-for-1 stock split. In a nutshell, Zuck can sell off or donate massive piles of stock to fund other projects without losing voting power. Meta (Zuck) is essentially letting Zuckerberg gradually cash out his new shares to cover a potential multi-billion-dollar California wealth tax, but only on the condition that he stays in California and continues running the company from headquarters for the next eight years. How did we get here? The decision was made by a Special Committee established in February 2026 consisting of Ambassador Robert M. Kimmitt, Charles Songhurst, and Tony Xu. “Special Committee Counsel summarized the findings of their independence analysis of the members of the Special Committee. Special Committee Counsel noted that Mr. Xu disclosed a personal friendship with Mr. Zuckerberg but that he affirmed that such relationship would have no impact on his ability to exercise his independent judgment in assessing a Potential Recapitalization.” Ambassador Kimmitt, Meta’s Lead Independent Director who chaired this Special Committee, is Senior International Counsel at WilmerHale. The filing reveals that Meta paid WilmerHale $62.3M in legal fees in 2025 alone (nearly 4% of the entire law firm’s annual revenue). It’s fine though because the Ambassador “is walled off from the firm’s representation of the Company.” Top 3 dumb things: The “I’m a Sad, Poor Billionaire” Defense: Since January 1, 2013, Mr. Zuckerberg has taken a salary of only $1 each year for his service as the Company’s chief executive officer and chairman of the Board. This is extraordinarily different from what his peer (and even non-peer) CEOs are paid. If the California wealth tax is enacted and Mr. Zuckerberg becomes liable for a tax payment, Mr. Zuckerberg would effectively be paying to serve as the Company’s chief executive officer while residing in California. “Independent” financial advisor Moelis & Company LLC’s conflict of interest is actually a good thing!: “In assessing Moelis' independence, the Special Committee noted that (i) a senior member of the proposed Moelis team, the name of whom was disclosed to the Special Committee, had acquired approximately 30,000 shares of Class A common stock of the Company, with such shares valued at $18,888,391 as of March 17, 2026 and that such interest was helpful in confirming that such senior member of the Moelis team was financially aligned with the Class A shareholders.” “The Special Committee Engaged in Robust Negotiations with Mr. Zuckerberg and Secured Meaningful New Commitments from Mr. Zuckerberg Regarding His Control and Leadership” “Mr. Zuckerberg would not consider changes to the terms of his voting shares, including the sunset provisions on the Class B common stock set forth in the Governance Proposal, and that Mr. Zuckerberg was considering establishing residence outside of California in light of the risk that California Proposition 40 could become law.” Stupid money… COPART: CEO A. Jayson Adair gets special equity award of 20M options worth up to about $788M: Tranche 1: $26.27 per share Tranche 2: $35.03 per share Tranche 3: $43.78 per share Tranche 4: $52.54 per share Trade Desk: options repricing A massive bailout for top executives—including CEO Jeff Green—who had their deeply underwater options slashed from as high as $75 down to $12.26 in exchange for just a six-month retention requirement. Final vote was 441M yes to 232M no Class A (1 vote per share) and and Class B (10 votes per share held almost entirely by founder/CEO Jeff Green) Heading into the October 19, 2026 Special Meeting, Green controlled roughly 42.1 million Class B shares, giving him 50.2% of the company's total voting power all by himself. Multiplied by 10, Green’s Class B shares alone represented approximately 421 million votes. Because Green was not required to recuse himself or abstain, he voted his super-voting shares "FOR" the proposal. EXPAND ENERGY: appointed Daniel E. Brown as CEO; Interim CEO Michael Wichterich will continue as board chair make-whole equity award to new CEO Daniel Brown worth $16M Interim CEO Michael Wichterich gets $1M equity for 8.5 months MATTEL: New CEO Roger Lynch golden hello equity awards: Make-Whole RSUs $6M & Inducement PRSUs $6M MongoDB: Interim CEO Dev Ittycheria (former CEO and current director) $500K golden hello cash; $15M equity vesting in 2027 Was CEO from 2014 to 2025 CFO Michael Berry retention award of $10M time-based equity with 100% accelerated vesting if terminated without cause or if he resigns for good reason Still caring about something COSTCO WHOLESALE: announced bonus awards to CEOs where $200K ($80K for NEOs) can be earned relating to environmental and social objectives based on quantitative performance metrics (including those concerning human capital and environmental-related areas). Board to C-Suite The leadership boondoggle: Down to 2F Overall: 19 director changes: 19% incoming directors are women; 33% outgoing are women PROXY CAGE MATCH Disney’s Former CEO Is Getting $100,000 a Month as Activist’s Nominee for Vail Board Oasis Management (9.6% stake in Vail Resorts) is paying former Disney CEO Bob Chapek $100,000 a month as a nominee for the board of Vail Resorts. Oasis also agreed to give Chapek a forgivable $500,000 loan to purchase Vail stock if he is elected to the company’s board Chapek is one of four nominees A proxy cage match at Empery Digital resulted in one director swap: Empery director Oran Olason was voted out (56% no) while one of four ATG Capital Management Nominees was voted in: Aaron T. Morris 56% yes. VOTE RESULTS TABLE Since October 14th: 3 companies Zero directors over 20% no; all boards averaged at least 93% yes; say on pay all over 91% yes PROCTER & GAMBLE 3 SHPs Lower Threshold for Special Meetings 37% yes: The Accountability Board Eligibility Thresholds Policy 26% yes: The National Legal and Policy Center adopt a policy committing the Company to include in its annual proxy statement any shareholder proposal submitted by a shareholder, or group of shareholders, that satisfies any of the following eligibility thresholds and is otherwise compliant with the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 14a-8, regardless of any future federal regulation permitting higher ownership or holding-period requirements, and consistent with applicable state law: shares of the Company's common stock with a market value of at least $2,000 held continuously for at least three years prior to submission; or shares of the Company's common stock with a market value of at least $15,000 held continuously for at least two years prior to submission; or shares of the Company's common stock with a market value of at least $25,000 held continuously for at least one year prior to submission. Charitable Contributions Reporting 4% yes: The Bahnsen Family Trust (conservative Christian advocate): 2023 anti-DEI proposal at JPMorgan: My Bid to Make JPMorgan Less Woke Upcoming Annual Shareholder Meetings 20 Meetings key takeaways Weird times Performance Food Group Company 8:00 A.M. ET Avnet 8:00 am local time (PT) Lumentum Holdings 8:00 a.m. Pacific Time Western Digital 8am PT Sysco 7:00 a.m. Central Time Sandisk 8am PT BGC Group 10am ET Non-virtual Tesla: both virtually and in person for a limited number of shareholders at Tesla’s Gigafactory Texas Avnet: Corporate Headquarters Very Sad CEO Pay Ratios Lumentum Holdings 1478:1 Western Digital 1457:1 Fabrinet 1317:1 Very Fake CEO Pay Ratios Tesla 0.00:1 (Elon) Atlassian Corporation 0.23 to 1 (dual class co-founder with 43% voting power Michael Cannon-Brookes) 1 Actual SHP The Campbell’s Company: report on the effectiveness of the Company’s regenerative agriculture program including pesticide reduction outcomes: As You Sow 1 Fake SHP Avnet: ​​Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 10% Ownership Threshold: John Chevedden Board Proposal to Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 25% Ownership Threshold Tesla December 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. Central Time both virtually and in person for a limited number of shareholders at Tesla’s Gigafactory Texas elect three Class I directors Elon Musk, Robyn Denholm and JB Straubel 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 0.00:1 One share one vote Elon Musk 20% ​ ​ Vanguard 5% Performance Food Group Company November 18, 2026 8:00 A.M. Eastern Time virtual elect 10 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 109:1 One share one vote Capital World Investors 15% BlackRock 9% Fidelity 7% Vanguard 5% George Holm 2% Atlassian Corporation December 1, 2026 2:00 p.m. Pacific Time virtual elect 9 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 0.23 to 1 Dual class Class A 1 vote per share BlackRock 1% voting power Class B 10 votes per share Michael Cannon-Brookes 43% voting power Scott Farquhar 43% voting power Avnet November 20, 2026 8:00 am local time (PT) Avnet’s Corporate Headquarters elect 10 directors Board Proposal to Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 25% Ownership Threshold 1 SHP ​​Provide Shareholders with the Ability to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting at a 10% Ownership Threshold: John Chevedden CEO Pay Ratio 250:1 One share one vote BlackRock 10% Dimensional Fund 7% Vanguard 8% Lumentum Holdings November 18, 2026 at 8:00 a.m. Pacific Time virtual elect 8 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 1478:1 One share one vote Vanguard 6% BlackRock 6% The Campbell’s Company November 17, 2026 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time virtual Elect 12 directors 1 SHP report on the effectiveness of the Company’s regenerative agriculture program including pesticide reduction outcomes: As You Sow CEO Pay Ratio 152:1 One share one vote Dorrance family 25% Bennett Dorrance 15% The Mary Alice Dorrance Malone Revocable Trust 10% Contango 6% Vanguard 8% BlackRock 9% Western Digital November 20, 2026 8am PT virtual Elect 9 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 1457:1 One share one vote BlackRock 9% Fidelity 7% Vanguard 8% JPMorgan Chase 5% Fabrinet December 10, 2026 9am PT virtual Elect two Class II directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 1317:1 One share one vote BlackRock 11% Vanguard 11% T. Rowe Price 5% Fidelity 5% Sysco November 13, 2026, at 7:00 a.m. Central Time virtual Elect 12 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 209:1 One share one vote Vanguard 13% BlackRock 8% State Street 5% Sandisk November 17, 2026 (8am PT) virtual Election of the eight director nominees 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 267:1 One share one vote Vanguard 8% BlackRock 6% Fidelity 5% Jane Street 5% BGC Group November 17, 2026 10am ET elect six directors 0 SHP co-CEOs Pay Ratio 77:1, 58:1 and 56:1 Dual class shares Class A Class B 10 votes per share Brandon G. Lutnick/Cantor Fitzgerald 75% Coherent November 18, 2026, at 12:00 p.m., ET virtual Election of four Class Three directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 1381:1 One share one vote Vanguard 7% BlackRock 7% Fidelity 6% Intapp November 17, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., Pacific Time virtual elect two Class III directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 89.9:1 One share one vote John Hall 8% Don Coleman 2% Thad Jampol 2% Anderson 22% Fidelity 7% BlackRock 6% Vanguard 5% Viavi Solutions November 11, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. Mountain Time virtual elect 9 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 149:1 One share one vote Vanguard 11% BlackRock 10% Oleg Khaykin 1% Donaldson Company November 20, 2026 at 1:00 p.m. (CST) virtual Elect 4 directors (classified) 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 135:1 One share one vote BlackRock 10% State Farm 8% Vanguard 11% The Clorox Company November 18, 2026 9:00 a.m. Pacific Time virtual elect 10 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 168:1 One share one vote BlackRock 8% Vanguard 7% State Street 7% Jack Henry & Associates November 19, 2026, 11:00 a.m. (CST) Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. HQ elect 9 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 87:1 One share one vote Kayne Anderson Rudnick 8% Vanguard 13% BlackRock 7% State Street 6% Resmed Wednesday, November 18, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. US Pacific Time; Thursday, November 19, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. Australian Eastern Time virtual Elect 10 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 199:1 One share one vote BlackRock 9% Vanguard 14% AustralianSuper 6% Cracker Barrel Old Country Store November 19, 2026 10am CT virtual elect nine directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 239:1 One share one vote D.E. Shaw 7% BlackRock 15% Vanguard 5% Nutanix December 11, 2026 9am PT virtual Elect 9 directors 0 SHP CEO Pay Ratio 201:1 One share one vote Fidelity 13% BlackRock 10% AQR Capital 6% Vanguard 5% Director Max de Groen 2% THE BIG VOTE Gameshow: Regulated or unregulated? I give you a series of scenarios, try to guess if it’s regulated under EU ESG Ratings rules that take effect in two weeks. EU Edition You go out and hand collect whether directors in Australia are considered “independent” according to the ASX and show the percentage of boards that are independent. You sell that data to an asset manager in Amsterdam. (NO REGULATION) You take your “independent” percentage and show a simple set of quartiles - which boards are “Top Quartile Independent” vs. “Bottom Quartile Independent” for Australian companies according to ASX standards.(REGULATE) You take your “independent” directors and only count the number of directors who wear dresses in their website images. You count which of them have engineering degrees and estimate, using average IQs of people who get engineering degrees, the percentage of independent directors who like dresses that are high IQ individuals and are also independent. (NO REGULATION) You say “having high IQ individuals on your board is good” and sell it to a French bank. (REGULATE) Under Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/3005, an assessment only qualifies as an ESG rating if it satisfies two distinct, cumulative conditions:It is based on an established methodology, AND It employs a defined ranking system of rating categories. Quartiles count as a ranking system. A “defined ranking system” had to be defined, so they clarified: "To adequately define the range of products to which this Regulation applies, the definition of ESG rating should be limited to opinions or scores, or a combination thereof, that are based on both an established methodology and a defined ranking system such as rating categories. For instance, the assignment of an item to a category or a scale that is either positive or negative, based on an established methodology..." You offer opinions about every director in Ireland, including whether they look like they may have body odor, the association of body odor and returns, and whether or not, in your opinion, a particular director lacking body odor is a Strong Performer on the cross section between body odor and returns. You put it on a web platform and it’s free for all. (REGULATE) You do the same exact thing, but you are a non profit. (NO REGULATION) “This Regulation does not apply to... ESG ratings published or distributed by non-profit organisations for non-commercial purposes” A dude you meet at a conference name Armond, who lives and works in the EU at a Belgian asset manager, loves your work on corporate governance - he wants to see all the rankings and analytics around directors, particularly stuff like how deferential a director is to management. You give him your card, high five him, and leave the conference. Armond goes to your website and signs up in his gmail account because his company will block the zine you send out, but he wants to read it. (NO REGULATION) Armond signs up with his Belgian asset manager email account, and the manager has no contract with you and you get zero dollars.(MAYBE REGULATION) Under Article 2(1)(b), a non-EU entity is captured if it issues and distributes ESG ratings: "...by subscription or other contractual relationships to regulated financial undertakings in the Union..." “Other contractual relationships” can include the Terms of Use - if they click a box saying “I agree to the terms of service”, even if the terms state explicitly that free accounts are not for commercial purposes and are for personal, individual use only, it becomes a “contractual relationship” Armond tells five of his colleagues how awesome the site is - he breaks the terms of service and starts downloading everything and mentions it routinely in calls and it informs his proxy voting. (TOTALLY SCREWED) ESMA and EU courts apply the "substance over form" doctrine. If ESMA audits that European asset manager and finds 6 investment analysts actively logging into your portal using their corporate credentials to pull governance scores, ESMA will reject the argument that "we only have a contract with individuals." They will treat your platform as actively distributing ratings to a regulated EU entity under Article 2(1)(b), even if you get zero dollars and it was Armond who screwed you by ignoring the ToS. Fun fact: it costs 40k EU to apply as a non EU company, non refundable with no guarantee of passage - and if you hire a lawyer, at least $30k in fees. They offer a cheaper option if you spend 10k setting up a EU subsidiary (with annual filings and auditing costs of at least 10k a year), then you can register for 2k EUR. But the auditing has to exist for everything - so just to ask to be an ESG ratings company, even if you don’t generate a rating that’s an actual rating, costs a non EU startup at least 70k up front and 15k a year - all for the honor of showing EU asset managers how their directors perform (without judgment). That’s the Proxy Countdown for the week of October 19, 2026. Join us next week when we jump back into the Alternative Democracy pool... forever on the lookout for shareholder shenanigans, dopey directors, scandalous CEO pay ratios, and wayward BandAids

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